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 Debating Targeting Methods for Cash Transfers: A Multidimensional Index vs. an Income Prox...
Targeting Performance by Target Group 0 10 20 30 40 50 In de x 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 alpha Extreme Poverty 0 10 20 30 40 50 In de x 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 alpha ICV40 ICV25 Proxy Means ICV - Proxy Means Poverty Note: alpha = under-coverage weight. Source: Own calculat...
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Targeting Performance by Target Group 0 10 20 30 40 50 In de x 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 alpha Extreme Poverty 0 10 20 30 40 50 In de x 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 alpha ICV40 ICV25 Proxy Means ICV - Proxy Means Poverty Note: alpha = under-coverage weight. Source: Own calculations based on EPH 2005. 7 CONCLUSION Tekoporã, Paraguay’s CCT programme, is currently being scaled up and its targeting mechanism re-evaluated. However, the simulations presented in this Evaluation Note suggest that changing
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=1
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=1
Changing <span class="highlight">from</span> the Quality of Life Index to a <span class="highlight">proxy</span>- means test for income is not likely to imply any gains in either efficiency or efficacy." Debating Targeting Methods for Cash Transfers: A Multidimensional Index vs. an Income <span class="highlight">Proxy</span> for Paraguay’s Tekoporã Programme Rafael Perez Ribas Guilherme Issamu Hirata Fábio Veras Soares International Poverty Centre IPCevaluationnote International Poverty Centre Family in Santa Rosa del Aguaray, Paraguay. Photo by Fábio Veras Soares (IPC). Number 2 January, 2008
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=5
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=5
the threshold of ICV to 40. This multidimensional framework was inspired by the Colombian experience with targeting social policies and was proposed by the consultants responsible for designing the best way for the Paraguay programme to distinguish poor households <span class="highlight">from</span> non-poor households. The choice of the ICV was motivated, in part, by the assumption that the income information available in household surveys—upon which a <span class="highlight">proxy</span>-means test would be <span class="highlight">based</span>—does not adequately capture the permanent income
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=11
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=11
there is no difference among the three targeting mechanisms in relation to the leakage rate since all curves overlap. FIGURE 2 Leakage as a Function of Coverage by Targeting Mechanism IC V 40 IC V 25 P M IC V -P M 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 Le ak ag e 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Coverage Extreme Poverty IC V 40 IC V 25 P M IC V -P M 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 Le ak ag e 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Coverage ICV <span class="highlight">Proxy</span> Means ICV - <span class="highlight">Proxy</span> Means Poverty Note: bandwidth = 0.2. Souce: Own calculations <span class="highlight">based</span>
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=13
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=13
Targeting Performance by Target Group 0 10 20 30 40 50 In de x 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 alpha Extreme Poverty 0 10 20 30 40 50 In de x 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 alpha ICV40 ICV25 <span class="highlight">Proxy</span> Means ICV - <span class="highlight">Proxy</span> Means Poverty Note: alpha = under-coverage weight. Source: Own calculations <span class="highlight">based</span> on EPH 2005. 7 CONCLUSION Tekoporã, Paraguay’s CCT programme, is currently being scaled up and its targeting mechanism re-evaluated. However, the simulations presented in this Evaluation Note suggest that changing
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=15
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote2.pdf#page=15
actually not poor. This is why the <span class="highlight">proxy</span> means curve (the figure on the left) does not start <span class="highlight">from</span> the origin. 7. We do not consider administrative costs in these statistics. These estimates are <span class="highlight">based</span> on the value of the transfers that should go to each target group. However, the different targeting options would imply similar administrative costs.
Monetary Policy and Financial Sector Reform for Employment Creation and Poverty Reduction ...
creation. Asset-based reserve requirements differ from other instruments, such as prescribed assets, w hich are sometimes used for the allocation of financial resources. A prescribed asset policy represents a type of financial quota. Under such policies, a certain fraction of a bank&r...
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creation. Asset-based reserve requirements differ from other instruments, such as prescribed assets, w hich are sometimes used for the allocation of financial resources. A prescribed asset policy represents a type of financial quota. Under such policies, a certain fraction of a bank’s
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy2.pdf#page=32
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy2.pdf#page=32
creation. Asset-<span class="highlight">based</span> reserve requirements differ <span class="highlight">from</span> other instruments, such as prescribed assets, w hich are sometimes used for the allocation of financial resources. A prescribed asset policy represents a type of financial quota. Under such policies, a certain fraction of a bank’s
Confronting Capacity Constraints on Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: the cases...
assured. Further tests with the formula and other targeting alternatives were to be conducted with the beneficiary database so as to confirm the validity and applicability of the targeting. 14. The IPG ranks the poorest districts in the country based on data from the 2002 Census data a...
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assured. Further tests with the formula and other targeting alternatives were to be conducted with the beneficiary database so as to confirm the validity and applicability of the targeting. 14. The IPG ranks the poorest districts in the country based on data from the 2002 Census data and the 2003 National Household Survey—Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH). Following a poverty map approach, the programme uses the data of the EPH to calculate poverty statistics at the district level.
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper38.pdf#page=32
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper38.pdf#page=32
assured. Further tests with the formula and other targeting alternatives were to be conducted with the beneficiary database so as to confirm the validity and applicability of the targeting. 14. The IPG ranks the poorest districts in the country <span class="highlight">based</span> on data <span class="highlight">from</span> the 2002 Census data and the 2003 National Household Survey—Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH). Following a poverty map approach, the programme uses the data of the EPH to calculate poverty statistics at the district level.
Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon
the level of the strata) is m ore likely to be effective in reducing both under-coverage and leakage errors. M oreover, policym akers could reduce leakages of benefits to the non- poor from poverty-reduction program m es by elim inating benefits to people whose incom es are known to be high,...
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the level of the strata) is m ore likely to be effective in reducing both under-coverage and leakage errors. M oreover, policym akers could reduce leakages of benefits to the non- poor from poverty-reduction program m es by elim inating benefits to people whose incom es are known to be high, such as em ployers (i.e., the self-em ployed who em ploy others) or by using a Proxy M eans Test to identify eligible persons. Broad targeting m ethods could also be used to direct m ore benefits to agricultural and
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy13.pdf#page=18
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy13.pdf#page=18
the level of the strata) is m ore likely to be effective in reducing both under-coverage and leakage errors. M oreover, policym akers could reduce leakages of benefits to the non- poor <span class="highlight">from</span> poverty-reduction program m es by elim inating benefits to people whose incom es are known to be high, such as em ployers (i.e., the self-em ployed who em ploy others) or by using a <span class="highlight">Proxy</span> M eans Test to identify eligible persons. Broad targeting m ethods could also be used to direct m ore benefits to agricultural and
Operational Poverty Targeting In Peru � Proxy Means Testing With Non-Income Indicat...
(e.g., Ahmed & Bouis, 2002; G rosh & Baker, 1995; Wodon, 1997). The approach pursued here departs from existing traditions in tw o w ays. The former refers to the prediction of household expenditures as such and the subsequent poverty classification of households in the sample, and th...
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(e.g., Ahmed & Bouis, 2002; G rosh & Baker, 1995; Wodon, 1997). The approach pursued here departs from existing traditions in tw o w ays. The former refers to the prediction of household expenditures as such and the subsequent poverty classification of households in the sample, and the latter to the validation and robustness tests of the proposed tools w ith regard to the transferability of the accuracy performance to further applications in the country. Firstly, although based on theoretical and
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper30.pdf#page=5
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper30.pdf#page=5
(e.g., Ahmed & Bouis, 2002; G rosh & Baker, 1995; Wodon, 1997). The approach pursued here departs <span class="highlight">from</span> existing traditions in tw o w ays. The former refers to the prediction of household expenditures as such and the subsequent poverty classification of households in the sample, and the latter to the validation and robustness tests of the proposed tools w ith regard to the transferability of the accuracy performance to further applications in the country. Firstly, although <span class="highlight">based</span> on theoretical and
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper30.pdf#page=16
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper30.pdf#page=16
International Conference “The many dimensions of poverty”, organized by the D epartment for International D evelopment (D FID ), Inter-American D evelopment Bank (<span class="highlight">ID</span> B), International Poverty Centre (IPC), U nited N ations D evelopment Programme (U N D P), and Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), August 29-31, 2005, Brasilia. Filmer, D ., & Prichett, L. (1999): The Effect of H ousehold Wealth on Educational Attainment: Evidence <span class="highlight">from</span> 35 Countries. Population and D evelopm ent Review 25, 85-120. Filmer
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Government Spending, Revenue and Domestic Borrowing in Ethiop...
18 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 41 FIG U RE 6 Source: IM F (IFS and Statistical Appendices) and ID S-D AC. Figure 6 above shows a strong correlation between the two variables: O D A (concessional) loans and foreign (commercial) borrowing. This suggests that most forei...
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18 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 41 FIG U RE 6 Source: IM F (IFS and Statistical Appendices) and ID S-D AC. Figure 6 above shows a strong correlation between the two variables: O D A (concessional) loans and foreign (commercial) borrowing. This suggests that most foreign loans to the government were provided on concessional terms, which is not particularly surprising due to the difficulty that some African countries face when borrowing from international markets. The higher IM
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper41.pdf#page=20
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper41.pdf#page=20
18 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 41 FIG U RE 6 Source: IM F (IFS and Statistical Appendices) and <span class="highlight">ID</span> S-D AC. Figure 6 above shows a strong correlation between the two variables: O D A (concessional) loans and foreign (commercial) borrowing. This suggests that most foreign loans to the government were provided on concessional terms, which is not particularly surprising due to the difficulty that some African countries face when borrowing <span class="highlight">from</span> international markets. The higher IM
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