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 Linkages between Pro-Poor Growth, Social Programmes and Labour Market: The Recent Brazilia...
36 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 26 Sim ilarly, we can calculate the contribution of each incom e com ponent to the growth rate of total per capita incom e: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4321 CCCC ttttt γγγγγ +++= (A.3) Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives...
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36 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 26 Sim ilarly, we can calculate the contribution of each incom e com ponent to the growth rate of total per capita incom e: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4321 CCCC ttttt γγγγγ +++= (A.3) Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives the contribution of each incom e com ponent to the inequality of total per capita incom e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4*3*2*1** CgCgCgCgg ttttt +++= (A.4)
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper26.pdf#page=30
28 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 26 contribution is particularly high in the latter period 2001-04. W hile non-social incom e appears to play a sm aller role in reducing inequality, the net im pact of social security has been quite im portant. D uring the first period (1995-2001), the net effect of social security resulted in an increase in inequality. Its net contribution on inequality was greater than the net contributions by the other two <span class="highlight">com</span> ponents. Nevertheless, the sum of the
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper26.pdf#page=38
36 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 26 Sim ilarly, we can calculate the contribution of each incom e <span class="highlight">com</span> ponent to the growth rate of total per capita incom e: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4321 CCCC ttttt γγγγγ +++= (A.3) Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives the contribution of each incom e <span class="highlight">com</span> ponent to the inequality of total per capita incom e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4*3*2*1** CgCgCgCgg ttttt +++= (A.4)
Assessing the pro-poorness of government fiscal policy in Thailand
4 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 15 w hich is the percentage of poor w ho w ill cross the poverty line as a result of 1 percent of grow th in the m ean incom e of the society. Substituting α)(),( z xz xzP −= into (4) gives the elasticity of θα w ith resp...
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4 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 15 w hich is the percentage of poor w ho w ill cross the poverty line as a result of 1 percent of grow th in the m ean incom e of the society. Substituting α)(),( z xz xzP −= into (4) gives the elasticity of θα w ith respect to µ as ( ) α αα α α α θ θθα θ µ ∂µ ∂θη −−== −1 (5) for α ≠ 0 , w hich w ill alw ays be negative because θα is a m onotonically decreasing function of α. 2.3 G ROW TH ELASTICITY OF INCOM E COM PONENTS The total (or net) incom e
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper15.pdf#page=6
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper15.pdf#page=6
4 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 15 w hich is the percentage of poor w ho w ill cross the poverty line as a result of 1 percent of grow th in the m ean incom e of the society. Substituting α)(),( z xz xzP −= into (4) gives the elasticity of θα w ith respect to µ as ( ) α αα α α α θ θθα θ µ ∂µ ∂θη −−== −1 (5) for α ≠ 0 , w hich w ill alw ays be negative because θα is a m onotonically decreasing function of α. 2.3 G ROW TH ELASTICITY OF INCOM E <span class="highlight">COM</span> PONENTS The total (or net) incom e
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper15.pdf#page=10
8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 15 w here µ is the m ean incom e of the disposable incom e and p qi i is the m ean expenditure of the ith <span class="highlight">com</span> m odity. The first term in (17) is the incom e effect of the price increase, w hich is alw ays positive because θη , given in (4), is negative. The second term is the redistribution or inequality effect of price change. It is the redistribution effect that tells us w hether an increase in price pi hurts the poor proportionally m ore than
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper15.pdf#page=14
12 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 15 4.2 ANALYSIS OF EM PIRICAL RESULTS Table 3 presents the values of poverty elasticity and the pro-poor index for different incom e <span class="highlight">com</span> ponents. Public policies can be assessed for different m easures of poverty. The head-count ratio is a crude m easure of poverty because it <span class="highlight">com</span> pletely ignores the gap in incom es from the poverty line and the distribution of incom e am ong the poor. The severity of the poverty index has all the desirable
Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil, Chile and Mexico: Impacts upon Inequality
8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 35 of recipient (e.g., w age em ployee or self-account w orker). The inform ation available in Chilean datasets m akes it very difficult, how ever, to reverse this adjustm ent. Also, this adjustm ent cannot be reproduced for the other countries....
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8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 35 of recipient (e.g., w age em ployee or self-account w orker). The inform ation available in Chilean datasets m akes it very difficult, how ever, to reverse this adjustm ent. Also, this adjustm ent cannot be reproduced for the other countries. The third challenge w as related to the construction of total incom e.6 This involved questions about w hat should be com puted, and w hat should not. In Chile and Mexico, it is custom ary to im pute the
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper35.pdf#page=8
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper35.pdf#page=8
6 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 35 The transfer has three basic <span class="highlight">com</span> ponents, tw o of w hich are conditional and one non- conditional. H ouseholds benefiting from O portunidades receive an unconditional transfer in the am ount of 250 pesos ($ 32 PPP) per elderly adult in the household. Additionally, households receive a food support transfer of 189 pesos ($ 24 PPP) conditional on attending training sessions on nutrition and health. The m ore substantive transfer, though, is the
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper35.pdf#page=10
8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 35 of recipient (e.g., w age em ployee or self-account w orker). The inform ation available in Chilean datasets m akes it very difficult, how ever, to reverse this adjustm ent. Also, this adjustm ent cannot be reproduced for the other countries. The third challenge w as related to the construction of total incom e.6 This involved questions about w hat should be <span class="highlight">com</span> puted, and w hat should not. In Chile and Mexico, it is custom ary to im pute the
Distinguishing Chronic Poverty from Transient Poverty in Brazil: Developing a Model for Ps...
18 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 36 Finally, 73 per cent of total observed poverty from 1993 to 2003 (0.2013 in Table 2) is derived from a chronic condition, or a ‘stationary’ propensity to poverty (0.1468/0.2013) w hile the rem aining 27 per cent is derived from...
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18 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 36 Finally, 73 per cent of total observed poverty from 1993 to 2003 (0.2013 in Table 2) is derived from a chronic condition, or a ‘stationary’ propensity to poverty (0.1468/0.2013) w hile the rem aining 27 per cent is derived from transient poverty (0.0545/0.2013). W hen different poverty lines are com pared, the deprivation w ith the highest chronic com ponent is that of absolute indigence (82 per cent) w hile the other absolute poverty m easures
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper36.pdf#page=20
18 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 36 Finally, 73 per cent of total observed poverty from 1993 to 2003 (0.2013 in Table 2) is derived from a chronic condition, or a ‘stationary’ propensity to poverty (0.1468/0.2013) w hile the rem aining 27 per cent is derived from transient poverty (0.0545/0.2013). W hen different poverty lines are <span class="highlight">com</span> pared, the deprivation w ith the highest chronic <span class="highlight">com</span> ponent is that of absolute indigence (82 per cent) w hile the other absolute poverty m easures
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper36.pdf#page=22
20 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 36 Sim ulations (1) and (5), w hen <span class="highlight">com</span> pared, show that the <span class="highlight">com</span> pletion of m iddle school education by the household head reduces the probability of chronic poverty and generates significant transient gains. This result is sim ilar to that regarding individual features analyzed in Table 3. The differences observed in the indicators reveal that education goes a long w ay in explaining not only the relative position of individuals in the incom e
Cash Transfer Programmes in Brazil: Impacts on Inequality and Poverty
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 21 2.3 DISAGG REGATING TH E “O TH ER INCO M ES” 2.3.1 Separating the Incom e Com ponents D eclared in “O ther Incom es” To separate the com ponent “other incom es”, the idiosyncrasies of each...
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10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 21 2.3 DISAGG REGATING TH E “O TH ER INCO M ES” 2.3.1 Separating the Incom e Com ponents D eclared in “O ther Incom es” To separate the com ponent “other incom es”, the idiosyncrasies of each program m e m ust be taken into consideration. In m onetary term s, the BPC is clearly differentiated from the other cash transfer program m es. O f the eight cash transfer program m es investigated by the 2004 PNAD supplem ent, it is the only one that is
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper21.pdf#page=12
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper21.pdf#page=12
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 21 2.3 DISAGG REGATING TH E “O TH ER INCO M ES” 2.3.1 Separating the Incom e <span class="highlight">Com</span> ponents D eclared in “O ther Incom es” To separate the <span class="highlight">com</span> ponent “other incom es”, the idiosyncrasies of each program m e m ust be taken into consideration. In m onetary term s, the BPC is clearly differentiated from the other cash transfer program m es. O f the eight cash transfer program m es investigated by the 2004 PNAD supplem ent, it is the only one that is
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper21.pdf#page=14
12 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 21 <span class="highlight">com</span> prise a series of transferences w ith rules that are distinct for each program m e and unknow n unidentifiable from the PNAD dataset, and there is no inform ation about the presence of disabled persons in the household, w hich is a problem for BPC. This does not m ean that there is no clear prevalence of typical values from the different cash transfer program m es: R$ 7—Cooking G as Stipend (per m onth); R$ 15—Bolsa Família and Bolsa Escola
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24 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 21 3.3 DECO M PO SITIO N O F TH E EFFECTS O N INEQ UALITY The recent reduction in inequality in Brazil is already a know n fact. Soares (2006) show s that the 2004 G ini Index (0.568) is the low est since the National H ousehold Survey started in the m id-1970’s.18 Despite the trem endous w eight of the labor incom e w hich <span class="highlight">com</span> prises 73% of the total incom e, an im portant part of the reduction in inequality can be attributed to the “other incom
Measuring the Impact of Price Changes on Poverty
6 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 33 ( ) ( ) ( ) � = � � � � � � � � − = − n i i i i * i * p pp 1 θηθ θθ p pp (15) w here iθη is the elasticity of θ w ith res...
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6 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 33 ( ) ( ) ( ) � = � � � � � � � � − = − n i i i i * i * p pp 1 θηθ θθ p pp (15) w here iθη is the elasticity of θ w ith respect to the price of the ith com m odity as defined in (11). The term on the right hand side of (15) m easures the im pact of the change in prices on poverty. How can w e m easure w hether changes in prices are pro-poor or anti-poor? To answ er this question
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper33.pdf#page=4
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper33.pdf#page=4
2 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 33 1 INTROD UCTION Changes in relative prices can have a large im pact on poverty yet m ost studies do not address the issue of relative prices.1 In the m easurem ent of trends in poverty, a <span class="highlight">com</span> m on m ethod is to update the poverty line over tim e using the Laspeyres price index, w hich uses the average budget shares as the w eights. This index is <span class="highlight">com</span> pletely insensitive to the distributional im pact of prices. Kenneth Arrow in 1958 noted that
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper33.pdf#page=6
4 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 33 ( ) ( )xw x xqp x p p x i iii i −=−= ∂ ∂ (5) w here ( )iw x is the budget share of the ith <span class="highlight">com</span> m odity at incom e level x. This equation im plies that if the price of the ith <span class="highlight">com</span> m odity increases by 1 percent, the real incom e (m oney m etric individual utility) x w ill decline by ( )iw x percent. This result w ill be used in the next section to derive the poverty elasticity w ith respect to prices. 4 PRICE ELASTICITY OF POVERTY To
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper33.pdf#page=8
6 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 33 ( ) ( ) ( ) � = � � � � � � � � − = − n i i i i * i * p pp 1 θηθ θθ p pp (15) w here iθη is the elasticity of θ w ith respect to the price of the ith <span class="highlight">com</span> m odity as defined in (11). The term on the right hand side of (15) m easures the im pact of the change in prices on poverty. How can w e m easure w hether changes in prices are pro-poor or anti-poor? To answ er this question
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper33.pdf#page=12
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper33.pdf#page=12
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 33 The percentage change in poverty due to price changes can be decom posed into tw o <span class="highlight">com</span> ponents, incom e and distribution effects. The incom e effect m easures the change in poverty w hen all prices increase uniform ly, w hereas the distribution effect captures the change in poverty because of changes in relative prices. The distribution effect reveals how changes in relative prices have affected the poor relative to the non-poor. It can be seen
New Global Poverty Counts
16 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 29 Lemma 1: If the people in tw o countries have the sam e calorie cost in food PPP dollars, then they w ill enjoy the sam e level of utility. As pointed out in Section 2, Lem m a 1 tells us that we can obtain internationally com parable...
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16 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 29 Lemma 1: If the people in tw o countries have the sam e calorie cost in food PPP dollars, then they w ill enjoy the sam e level of utility. As pointed out in Section 2, Lem m a 1 tells us that we can obtain internationally com parable food poverty lines if we determ ine the food poverty line in each country by using a constant calorie cost in food PPP dollars across all countries. Thus, the internationally com parable food poverty line (denoting
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper29.pdf#page=18
16 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 29 Lemma 1: If the people in tw o countries have the sam e calorie cost in food PPP dollars, then they w ill enjoy the sam e level of utility. As pointed out in Section 2, Lem m a 1 tells us that we can obtain internationally <span class="highlight">com</span> parable food poverty lines if we determ ine the food poverty line in each country by using a constant calorie cost in food PPP dollars across all countries. Thus, the internationally <span class="highlight">com</span> parable food poverty line (denoting
Gearing macroeconomic polices to manage large inflows of ODA: The implications for HIV/AID...
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 17 com petitiveness of a country’s exports. The central bank can offset (sterilise) the aid induced increase in its assets (N FR) in various ways. First, it can sell governm ent bonds (CRG) to the non-bank private sector. Second, it...
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10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 17 com petitiveness of a country’s exports. The central bank can offset (sterilise) the aid induced increase in its assets (N FR) in various ways. First, it can sell governm ent bonds (CRG) to the non-bank private sector. Second, it can raise the reserve requirem ent for com m ercial bank deposits, and thereby reduce their ability to create credit. Thirdly, it can ask the governm ent to shift its deposits from com m ercial banks to the central bank
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper17.pdf#page=12
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper17.pdf#page=12
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 17 <span class="highlight">com</span> petitiveness of a country’s exports. The central bank can offset (sterilise) the aid induced increase in its assets (N FR) in various ways. First, it can sell governm ent bonds (CRG) to the non-bank private sector. Second, it can raise the reserve requirem ent for <span class="highlight">com</span> m ercial bank deposits, and thereby reduce their ability to create credit. Thirdly, it can ask the governm ent to shift its deposits from <span class="highlight">com</span> m ercial banks to the central bank
The Impact of Relative Prices on Welfare and Inequality in Brazil, 1995-2005
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 37 Chart 4 illustrates a case of second order stochastic dom inance using the 1995 and 2005 incom e distributions. If the tw o are com pared, neither dom inates the other in the first degree since the relatively poor w ere better off in 2...
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10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 37 Chart 4 illustrates a case of second order stochastic dom inance using the 1995 and 2005 incom e distributions. If the tw o are com pared, neither dom inates the other in the first degree since the relatively poor w ere better off in 2005 and the relatively rich in 1995. H ow ever, since the accum ulated incom e in 2005 is greater than in 1995 for all positions, the form er dom inates the latter in the second order com parison. Put in other w ords
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper37.pdf#page=10
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper37.pdf#page=10
8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 37 3.2 TH E EVO LUTIO N O F W ELFARE AND IN EQ U ALITY: 1995-2005 W e now analyze the evolution of w elfare and inequality am ong the Brazilian population through <span class="highlight">com</span> parison of sum m ary and full distribution m easures. W e also <span class="highlight">com</span> pare results obtained through the use of a general deflator w ith those obtained through the hundredth- specific deflators described in the previous section. Before proceeding further, w e w ish to w arn all readers that
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper37.pdf#page=12
10 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 37 Chart 4 illustrates a case of second order stochastic dom inance using the 1995 and 2005 incom e distributions. If the tw o are <span class="highlight">com</span> pared, neither dom inates the other in the first degree since the relatively poor w ere better off in 2005 and the relatively rich in 1995. H ow ever, since the accum ulated incom e in 2005 is greater than in 1995 for all positions, the form er dom inates the latter in the second order <span class="highlight">com</span> parison. Put in other w ords
The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Nutrition: The South African Child Support G...
8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 39 H oddinott 2005), then evaluation of treatm ent effects by com paring the treated and the not- treated w ould be relatively sim ple. H ow ever, the South African CSG w as not im plem ented w ith an experim ental design. As show n in th...
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8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 39 H oddinott 2005), then evaluation of treatm ent effects by com paring the treated and the not- treated w ould be relatively sim ple. H ow ever, the South African CSG w as not im plem ented w ith an experim ental design. As show n in the table, non-treated children can be grouped into three categories: those w ho received the child support grant only after they w ere three years old (321 children); those w ho had applied for CSG support but had their
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http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper39.pdf#page=10
www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper39.pdf#page=10
8 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 39 H oddinott 2005), then evaluation of treatm ent effects by <span class="highlight">com</span> paring the treated and the not- treated w ould be relatively sim ple. H ow ever, the South African CSG w as not im plem ented w ith an experim ental design. As show n in the table, non-treated children can be grouped into three categories: those w ho received the child support grant only after they w ere three years old (321 children); those w ho had applied for CSG support but had their
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www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper39.pdf#page=14
12 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 39 The <span class="highlight">com</span> m unity questionnaire also asked about the m ain im provem ents in the <span class="highlight">com</span> m unity since 1999. Corroborating the evidence that health services have not been generally im proving over the period of the CSG grant, only six per cent of <span class="highlight">com</span> m unities identified hospitals and clinics as the m ost im proved service since 1999, and another 4.7 per cent and 6.4 per cent listed them as the second and third m ost im proved service. These num bers
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