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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: biodiversity
Gaston 1996). "Biodiversity" was coined as a contraction of "biological diversity" in 1985, but the new term arguably has taken on a meaning and import all its own. A symposium in 1986, and the follow-up book BioDiversity (Wilson 1988), edited by biolo...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Darwinism
principles. Privately, Darwin learned, Herschel had referred to his theory as ‘the Law of higgledy-piggledy’, presumably a reference to the large element played in its key principles by chance and probability. Darwin's theory is, as we would say today, a ‘stati...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: heredity and heritability
environment. For any given trait, say height, we get the following results: If heritability is high and variation is due mostly to genes, then monozygotic twins will be closer in height than fraternal twins. If heritability is low and variation in height is due mostly...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: logic
simplest being the following. Let us take as a first proposition p, e.g., that “there is no truth”. Then if p is true, it is our first truth; if p is false, some other proposition is true, e.g. non-p. Thus there is at least one truth. Now, “ ‘p...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Bolzano, Bernard
his logic. This assessment of the different parts of the Theory of Science coincides with Bolzano's own judgment, according to which the “philosophical gain” is only in the first three (indeed, first two) volumes (Bolzano 1965, 232): the theory of elem...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: life
different, depending upon the interests of the authors. Each attempt at a definition are inextricably linked to a theory from which it derives its meaning (Benner 2010). Some biologists and philosophers even reject the whole idea of there being a need for a defini...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: of belief revision
are doxastically committed to believe in all the logical consequences of our beliefs, but typically our performance does not live up to this commitment. The belief set is the set of the agent's epistemic commitments, and therefore larger than the set of her actuall...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: epistemological problems of
fact that hearers do typically accept speakers' testimony: If the speaker S asserts that p to the hearer H, then, under normal conditions, it is correct for H to accept (believe) S's assertion, unless H has special reason to object. The use of “correct” in the DR r...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: population
molecular data. In recent years, the controversy has subsided somewhat, without a clear victory for either side. Most biologists believe that some molecular variants are indeed neutral, though fewer than were claimed by the original neutralists. 3.4 Migration Migration into or out of...
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: convention
knows that everyone knows that p, etc. The subsequent game-theoretic and philosophical literature offers several different ways of formalizing this intuitive idea, due to researchers such as Robert Aumann (1976) and Stephen Schiffer (1972). Recently, some controver...
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