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 United Kingdom: Butler Report
September dossier, must now be treated as unsafe. LIAISON SERVICE SOURCES 406. As noted above, one source provided the vast majority of the intelligence that suggested that Iraq had developed mobile facilities for the production of biological agent. In oral evidence to ou...
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September dossier, must now be treated as unsafe. LIAISON SERVICE SOURCES 406. As noted above, one source provided the vast majority of the intelligence that suggested that Iraq had developed mobile facilities for the production of biological agent. In oral evidence to our Review in May, the Chief of SIS said that this source’s reports had been received through a liaison service and that he had not therefore been under the control of SIS. SIS had been able to verify that he had worked in an area which would have
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=72
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
231. The JIC went on to say: We believe that Iraq retains some production equipment, stocks <span class="highlight">of</span> CW precursors, <span class="highlight">agent</span> and weapons, . . . [JIC, 10 May 2001] 232. It also noted that: . . . intelligence <span class="highlight">of</span> other related CW activity, including possible weaponisation, is less clear. [JIC, 10 May 2001] 233. As well as the prior intelligence, described above, these judgements appear to have been <span class="highlight">based</span> on three main pieces <span class="highlight">of</span> evidence: a. A single report from a new source who reported details <span class="highlight">of</span> a project three
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=74
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
Continuing intelligence reports from the liaison <span class="highlight">service</span> on Iraqi mobile biological <span class="highlight">agent</span> production facilities had a significant impact on the next JIC assessment, produced in February 2002, which noted that: Iraq . . . if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities <span class="highlight">of</span> BW <span class="highlight">agent</span> within days. . . . [JIC, 27 February 2002] 245. We were told that this further shortening <span class="highlight">of</span> production timescales - from weeks to days - was <span class="highlight">based</span> on a more thorough understanding <span class="highlight">of</span> the capabilities <span class="highlight">of</span> the mobile
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=102
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
was <span class="highlight">based</span> on the receipt <span class="highlight">of</span> one intelligence report, from a reliable and established source quoting a new sub-source. That report reinforced the large volume <span class="highlight">of</span> reports on those facilities received from a single source through a liaison <span class="highlight">service</span> since April 2000, although our view is that the new report was complementary to rather than confirming those from the liaison <span class="highlight">service</span>. 350. On Iraq’s ballistic missile programme, a JIC assessment <span class="highlight">of</span> December 2002 sustained the judgement it had made over the past two
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=115
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
September dossier, must now be treated as unsafe. LIAISON <span class="highlight">SERVICE</span> SOURCES 406. As noted above, one source provided the vast majority <span class="highlight">of</span> the intelligence that suggested that Iraq had developed mobile facilities for the production <span class="highlight">of</span> biological <span class="highlight">agent</span>. In oral evidence to our Review in May, the Chief <span class="highlight">of</span> SIS said that this source’s reports had been received through a liaison <span class="highlight">service</span> and that he had not therefore been under the control <span class="highlight">of</span> SIS. SIS had been able to verify that he had worked in an area which would have
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=116
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
<span class="highlight">service</span> on Iraqi production <span class="highlight">of</span> biological <span class="highlight">agent</span> were seriously flawed, so that the grounds for JIC assessments drawing on those reports that Iraq had recently-produced stocks <span class="highlight">of</span> biological <span class="highlight">agent</span> no longer exist. OTHER SOURCES 411. A handful <span class="highlight">of</span> other sources, and liaison reporting, comprised the remaining quarter <span class="highlight">of</span> the human intelligence base reporting on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes in 2002. Very few <span class="highlight">of</span> their reports were judged by the JIC to be material to the judgements
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