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“confirming” the intelligence on Iraqi mobile biological agent production facilities received from the liaison service. Contrary to the JIC view at the time, we believe that this report would have been more accurately described as “complementary” to, rather than “confirming”, it4. 304. The JIC made clear that much of the assessment was based on its own judgement, drawing on the work done for its assessment of 21 August. But we were struck by the relative thinness of the intelligence base supporting the

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production equipment and weaponised agent, continue to be concealed. [JIC, 12 June 1996] 186. We enquired into the reason for this shift in the JIC’s view, in the apparent absence of underpinning reliable intelligence. We were told that the changed assessment was based on the impact of Hussein Kamil’s defection, UNSCOM’s inability to reconcile Iraqi claims for production and destruction, unaccounted-for growth media and a total lack of co- operation from the Iraqis. 187. The JIC included a similar judgement in an

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231. The JIC went on to say: We believe that Iraq retains some production equipment, stocks of CW precursors, agent and weapons, . . . [JIC, 10 May 2001] 232. It also noted that: . . . intelligence of other related CW activity, including possible weaponisation, is less clear. [JIC, 10 May 2001] 233. As well as the prior intelligence, described above, these judgements appear to have been based on three main pieces of evidence: a. A single report from a new source who reported details of a project three

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Continuing intelligence reports from the liaison service on Iraqi mobile biological agent production facilities had a significant impact on the next JIC assessment, produced in February 2002, which noted that: Iraq . . . if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agent within days. . . . [JIC, 27 February 2002] 245. We were told that this further shortening of production timescales - from weeks to days - was based on a more thorough understanding of the capabilities of the mobile

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“confirming” the intelligence on Iraqi mobile biological agent production facilities received from the liaison service. Contrary to the JIC view at the time, we believe that this report would have been more accurately described as “complementary” to, rather than “confirming”, it4. 304. The JIC made clear that much of the assessment was based on its own judgement, drawing on the work done for its assessment of 21 August. But we were struck by the relative thinness of the intelligence base supporting the

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was based on the receipt of one intelligence report, from a reliable and established source quoting a new sub-source. That report reinforced the large volume of reports on those facilities received from a single source through a liaison service since April 2000, although our view is that the new report was complementary to rather than confirming those from the liaison service. 350. On Iraq’s ballistic missile programme, a JIC assessment of December 2002 sustained the judgement it had made over the past two

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September dossier, must now be treated as unsafe. LIAISON SERVICE SOURCES 406. As noted above, one source provided the vast majority of the intelligence that suggested that Iraq had developed mobile facilities for the production of biological agent. In oral evidence to our Review in May, the Chief of SIS said that this source’s reports had been received through a liaison service and that he had not therefore been under the control of SIS. SIS had been able to verify that he had worked in an area which would have

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service on Iraqi production of biological agent were seriously flawed, so that the grounds for JIC assessments drawing on those reports that Iraq had recently-produced stocks of biological agent no longer exist. OTHER SOURCES 411. A handful of other sources, and liaison reporting, comprised the remaining quarter of the human intelligence base reporting on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes in 2002. Very few of their reports were judged by the JIC to be material to the judgements

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