iSEEK - Education

correlation of intelligence producing a total result which has been greater than the sum of the parts. The intelligence agencies have employed a range of ingenious tactics patiently and skilfully to piece together an intelligence picture of North Korean activity. This has provided important insights that have enabled the British Government to take decisive action to limit the extent of North Korean exports of missile delivery systems. 106. Intelligence continues to contribute to specific actions against missile

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559 134 Dusty Mustard 560-565 136 6.9 Dr Jones’s Dissent 566-568 137 Use of the Available Intelligence Material 569-572 137 The Handling of Intelligence 573-578 138 6.10 Oil Supplies 579 139 Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS ON BROADER ISSUES 141 7.1 General Conclusions About Intelligence 580 141 and its Use Other Cases 581-582 141 International Co-operation 583-584 141 Co-ordination of Counter-Proliferation Activity 585 142 7.2 Intelligence Machinery 142 The Defence Intelligence Staff 586-590 142 The Joint Intelligence

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International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Inter-continental Ballistic Missile Imint Imagery intelligence ISC Intelligence and Security Committee, UK ISG Iraq Survey Group JIC Joint Intelligence Committee, UK Jihad The usual translation ‘holy war’ is misleading; ‘exertion’ or ‘struggle’ is more accurate: “A general injunction to strive in the way of God” (Albert Hourani: A History of the Arab Peoples, Faber and Faber, 1992) JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, UK KAZ Kurdish Autonomous Zone (of Iraq) x

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CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE “Much of the intelligence that we receive in war is contradictory, even more of it is plain wrong, and most of it is fairly dubious. What one can require of an officer, under these circumstances, is a certain degree of discrimination, which can only be gained from knowledge of men and affairs and from good judgement. The law of probability must be his guide.” [Clausewitz, On War, Vol I, Bk I, Ch VI] 1.1 INTRODUCTION 20. In view of the subject matter of our

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areas, can provide characteristic indicators. Missile testing may involve the generation of considerable heat, which can be detected, and missiles may be tracked by radar. 26. In the case of the weapons covered by this Review, there is additionally another category of information which is frequently mentioned by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in its assessments. International inspection and enforcement bodies have been established, on a permanent basis (e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency), or

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machinery, and its priorities and work programme are linked with those of the Cabinet Office. 32. Analysis can be conducted only by people expert in the subject matter – a severe limitation when the topic is as specialised as biological warfare or uranium enrichment, or the internal dynamics of terrorist cells or networks. A special danger here can be the failure to recognise just what particular expertise is required. The British intelligence assessment of the German V-2 rocket during the Second World War was

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satellite states14. As the details which had been sought became more accessible, first through glasnost’ and explicit exchanges of data under international agreements and then fairly readily through open sources after the dissolution of the Soviet empire, most of the intelligence community’s conclusions were vindicated – at least in the areas in which it had spent the largest part of its efforts, the Soviet bloc’s military equipment, capabilities and order of battle. 54. But it is risky to transfer one model to

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correlation of intelligence producing a total result which has been greater than the sum of the parts. The intelligence agencies have employed a range of ingenious tactics patiently and skilfully to piece together an intelligence picture of North Korean activity. This has provided important insights that have enabled the British Government to take decisive action to limit the extent of North Korean exports of missile delivery systems. 106. Intelligence continues to contribute to specific actions against missile

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response to nuclear, chemical and biological threats and ensures that defence considerations are taken into account in the Government’s counter-proliferation policy. The Defence Intelligence Staff provides detailed advice across the full range of counter-proliferation issues, including technical analysis of weapons, production programmes, delivery systems and procurement networks. 141. HM Customs and Excise are responsible for the enforcement of export licensing controls including the investigation and prosecution

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Iraq is seeking to develop new, larger liquid and solid propellant missiles, contrary to UN limits. Recent intelligence indicates personnel associated with the Al Samoud programme have now been tasked to concentrate on designing liquid propellant systems with ranges of 2000–3000km. New intelligence indicates the main focus may be on the development of a SCUD derivative, which we judge has an intended range of around 1200km . . . Providing sanctions remain effective, Iraq is unlikely to be able to produce a

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conclude that arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the need for protection of sources should not prevent the exposure of reports on technical matters to the most expert available analysis. The quality of JIC assessments 453. We were impressed by the quality of intelligence assessments on Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. They were in our view thorough, balanced and measured; brought together effectively human and technical intelligence information; included information on the perceived quality of the

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senior officials to take a broad view that differs from the opinions of those with expertise on points of detail. We do not, however, consider that the report held back fromDr Jones and his staff (which Dr Jones’ superiors regarded as justifying thecertainty of the language in thedossier)wasone towhich such considerations should have applied. The judgement reached by the JIC in this case should have been able to depend on detailed, expert analysis of the intelligence. In the event, the JIC had no reason to know

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described there are now publicly known. Nevertheless, the material we have published for the first time in this Report illustrates the contribution of intelligence reports and assessments to the handling of each of these cases over recent years. Intelligence has been validated to an impressive extent by what has been subsequently revealed and has played a crucial part in enabling developing threats to international security and stability to be identified and countered. For obvious reasons, we have not discussed the

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co-locate them. Moreover, we are impressed with the growing co- operation between departments and agencies and the exploitation of technical expertise through cross-postings and secondments. However, we consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together the various sources of expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each other

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in support of the execution of this policy to inform planning for a military campaign; to inform domestic and international opinion, in support of the Government’s advocacy of its changing policy towards Iraq; and to obtain and provide information to United Nations inspectors. (Paragraph 431) 12. Iraq was not the only issue on which the intelligence agencies, the JIC and the departments concerned were working during this period. Other matters, including terrorism and the activities of other countries of

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unduly strict ‘compartmentalisation’ of intelligence. It was wrong that a report which was of significance in the drafting of a document of the importance of the dossier was not shown to key experts in the DIS who could have commented on the validity and credibility of the report. We conclude that arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the need for protection of sources should not prevent the exposure of reports on technical matters to the most expert available analysis. (Paragraphs 452) 25

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would have been more appropriate for senior managers in the DIS and SIS to have made arrangements for the intelligence to be shown to DIS experts rather than their making their own judgements on its significance. (Paragraph 576/577) OIL SUPPLIES 56. We saw no evidence that a motive of the British Government for initiating military action was securing continuing access to oil supplies. (Paragraph 579) CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS ON BROADER ISSUES INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 57. We note that much of what was reliably

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Air Marshal Joe French Julian Miller Lieutenant General Andrew Ridgway Sir Kevin Tebbit Simon Webb and four members of the Defence Intelligence Staff (iv) Members of the intelligence community Sir Richard Dearlove Eliza Manningham-Buller Dr David Pepper and one member of GCHQ, and two members of the Secret Intelligence Service International Organisations Dr Hans Blix 161

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