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 United Kingdom: Butler Report
237. We were told that the reason for the shortening of timescales in the JIC’s judgements about likely biological agent production - from months in earlier JIC assessments to weeks - was intelligence of Iraqi requests for large quantities of growth media. We were t...
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237. We were told that the reason for the shortening of timescales in the JIC’s judgements about likely biological agent production - from months in earlier JIC assessments to weeks - was intelligence of Iraqi requests for large quantities of growth media. We were told that these were judged to be greatly inexcess of Iraq’s likely legitimate requirements, on whichadvice had been sought from medical experts familiar with commercial and hospital requirements for growth media. It is not known if the growth
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=11
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
TERMINOLOGY 1. We use the following terms in this report: Munitions Projectiles, bombs, warheads or dispensing systems. Weapons Munitions <span class="highlight">and</span> their delivery systems. Chemical/BiologicalAgent The non-explosive fill for chemical/<span class="highlight">biological</span> munitions. Programme Means that people <span class="highlight">and</span> resources are being allocated under a management structure for either the <span class="highlight">research</span> <span class="highlight">and</span> development <span class="highlight">of</span> a WMD capability or the production <span class="highlight">of</span> munitions. It does not necessarily mean that WMD munitions have been produced, as only
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=33
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
November 2003 the UK <span class="highlight">and</span> US Governments approached the <span class="highlight">Malaysian</span> authorities to investigate a <span class="highlight">Malaysian</span> company run by BSA Tahir. According to the official <span class="highlight">Malaysian</span> police report: His [Tahir’s] involvement . . . started in 1994/1995. That year the [Pakistani nuclear expert] had asked B S A Tahir to send two containers <span class="highlight">of</span> used centrifuge units from Pakistan to Iran. B S A Tahir organised the transshipment <span class="highlight">of</span> the two containers from Dubai to Iran using a merchant ship owned by a company in Iran. B S A Tahir said
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=73
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
237. We were told that the reason for the shortening <span class="highlight">of</span> timescales in the JIC’s judgements about likely <span class="highlight">biological</span> agent production - from months in earlier JIC assessments to weeks - was intelligence <span class="highlight">of</span> Iraqi requests for large quantities <span class="highlight">of</span> growth media. We were told that these were judged to be greatly inexcess <span class="highlight">of</span> Iraq’s likely legitimate requirements, on whichadvice had been sought from <span class="highlight">medical</span> experts familiar with commercial <span class="highlight">and</span> hospital requirements for growth media. It is not known if the growth
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http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page=131
www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf#page...
b. In support <span class="highlight">of</span> that goal, was carrying out illicit <span class="highlight">research</span> <span class="highlight">and</span> development, <span class="highlight">and</span> procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities. c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; but did not have significant - if any - stocks <span class="highlight">of</span> chemical or <span class="highlight">biological</span> weapons in a state fit for deployment, or developed plans for using them. 117
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